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Abstract
Since voters are often swayed more by the personal image of politicians than by party manifestos,
they may cast votes that are in opposition to their policy preferences. This results in the election
of representatives who do not correspond exactly to the voters’ own views. An alternative voting
procedure to avoid this type of election failure is proposed in [Tangian 2016a, Tangian 2016b].
It is based on the approach implemented in internet voting advice applications, like the German
Wahl-O-Mat, which asks the user a number of questions on topical policy issues; the computer
program, drawing on all the parties’ answers, finds for the user the best-matching party, the
second-best-matching party, etc. Under the proposed alternative election method, the voters
cast no direct votes. Rather, they are asked about their preferences on the policy issues as
declared in the party manifestos (Introduce nationwide minimum wage? Yes/No; Introduce a
speed limit on the motorways? Yes/No, etc.), which reveals the balance of public opinion on
each issue. These embedded referenda measure the degree to which the parties’ policies match
the preferences of the electorate. The parliament seats are then distributed among the parties in
proportion to their indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented
on all the issues) and universality (frequency in representing a majority).
This paper reports on an experimental application of this method during the election of
the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Student Parliament on July 4–8, 2016. The experiment
shows that the alternative election method can increase the representativeness of the Student
Parliament. We also discuss some traits and bottlenecks of the method that should be taken
into account when preparing elections.
Keywords: Policy representation, representative democracy, direct democracy, elections,
coalitions, theory of voting.
JEL Classification: D71
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1 Introduction
The late 18th century fundamental debate on political representation focused primarily on two
questions: Who should be represented?, i.e. who is entitled to vote (males or also females, with
which civil and property status, etc.) andWho can be a representative? (sons of the constituency
or all trusted citizens, taxpayers of a certain level, etc.) [Manin 1997]. The questionWhat should
be represented?, i.e. which policies should be pursued on behalf of the electorate and how well
the political system represents the electorate’s policy preferences, was of secondary importance.
The latter started to be widely discussed only in the 1960s when the dedicated notion of policy
representation was coined [Miller and Stokes 1963, Pitkin 1967].
In elections, the question Who? still outbalances the question What?, and voting for candi-
dates or parties by name bears some of the responsibility for that. Since people are often swayed
more by the personal image of politicians than by party manifestos, they may cast votes that
are actually in opposition to their policy preferences, resulting in the election of representatives
who do not correspond exactly to the voters’ own views. This phenomenon of irrational voting
behavior and this type of election failure are analyzed using as example the 2013 German federal
election in [Tangian 2016a].
Since the end of the 1990s, policy representation has attracted more attention, in particular
due to the internet propagation of voting advice applications (VAAs) which run under various
names in about 20 countries [Garzia and Marschall 2014, Vote match Europe 2014]. For in-
stance, the pioneering Dutch VAA is called StemWijzer (= VoteMatch) [Pro demos 2014], and
its German version is called Wahl-O-Mat (an invented word composed from the German Wahl
= election and Automat) [Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung 2014]. The VAA user is asked
a number of questions on topical policy issues (Introduce nationwide minimum wage? Yes/No;
Introduce a speed limit on the motorways? Yes/No, etc.); the computer program, drawing
on the parties’ answers to these same questions, finds for the user the best-matching party, the
second-best-matching party, etc. This method removes the emotional aspect from the evaluation
of the parties, relying instead on their representative capacity alone.
Basing on the VAA approach, [Tangian 2016b] proposes an election procedure aimed at sur-
mounting the partiality inherent in voting for an individual or for a party by name. In the
election method proposed, the voters cast no direct votes. Rather, they are asked about their
preferences on the policy issues as declared by the parties before the election through their
manifestos, exactly like in the VAAs. However, unlike in the VAAs, individual choices are not
prompted, but the balance of public opinion is determined for every question. In other words,
voting by name is replaced with several referenda, which are used to measure the degree to
which the parties’ policy profiles match that of the electorate. Then the parliament seats are
distributed among the parties in proportion to their indices of popularity (the average percent-
age of the population represented on the issues) and universality (frequency in representing a
majority). This election procedure is hypothetically applied to redistribute seats in the 2013
German Bundestag (federal parliament), achieving a significant gain in its representativeness.
The electorate’s policy profile is constructed from 36 public opinion polls preceding the election,
and the party positions are taken from the 2013 Wahl-O-Mat. Since the public opinion polls
have differing levels of reliability and relevance to the 2013 election, the conclusions — as they
are based on imperfect data — can be considered only with reservations.
To judge more definitively the advantages of the election method proposed, one needs a
real experiment with real electoral ballots. This paper reports on just such an experiment
performed during the election of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Student Parliament on
July 4–8, 2016. The 1069 experimental ballots — with both party names and ten questions on
university policies — show that the policy representativeness of the KIT Student Parliament
that would have been elected using the alternative method is higher than that elected by the
official method (solely party names). At the same time, a few Traits of the alternative election
method are revealed which should be taken into account when preparing its application.
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Section 2, ‘The 2016 election to the KIT Student Parliament’, outlines the context of the
2016 Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Student Parliament election.
Section 3, ‘The experimental election to the KIT Student Parliament’, describes the organi-
zation of our electoral experiment.
Section 4, ‘Policy representation by the student parties and the Student Parliament’, intro-
duces the indices of popularity and universality to measure policy representation of both the
student parties and the Student Parliament.
In Section 5, ‘Evaluation of coalitions’, the policy representation of the KIT Student Parlia-
ment, as steered by eligible coalitions, is estimated.
Section 6, ‘Discussion’, explains the operational and philosophical traits of the alternative
election method tested in this paper.
Section 7, ‘Conclusions’, summarizes the findings of the experiment and suggests a few
improvements.
Section 8, ‘Appendix: StuPa-O-Mat questions and student party positions’, contains the
student parties’ answers to all the questions of the StuPa-O-Mat — the KIT adaptation of the
Wahl-O-Mat for the 2016 KIT Student Parliament election.
2 The 2016 election to the KIT Student Parliament
German student parliaments are university representative bodies established according to the
laws of the corresponding German state. In the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), the
Student Parliament (StuPa) is constituted under the rules of the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
Its responsibilities include electing officers to the executive organ of the student body, AStA (All-
gemeiner Studierendenausschuss = General Committee of Students), making decisions about
the budget of the student body and participating in the university commissions and coun-
cils. During the semester, the StuPa meets bi-weekly and the meetings are open to the public
[AStA 2016, StuPa 2016].
Elections to the StuPa are held every summer, and all the KIT students are eligible to vote.
The StuPa seats are distributed among student parties in proportion to the number of votes they
receive in elections. The 2016/17 StuPa consists of 25 MPs from seven student parties, most of
which are nationwide and some having international affiliations; for their political orientation see
Table 1.1 Four of them, Juso, LHG, die Linke.SDS and die LISTE, are closely associated with
and supported by German political parties. Two student parties, the RCDS and Rosa Liste, are
close to the established political parties or organizations but declare their independence. And
the FiPS is a local student organization of the KIT that is autonomous. It should be noted that
the German student organizations are not related one-to-one with their corresponding political
parties, as they have discrete historical roots. They prefer to call themselves ‘a group’, ‘an
alliance’, ‘a list’, ‘an association’ or even ‘a faculty experience’, thereby emphasizing relaxed
forms of adherence and/or no self-identification as real parties.
The 2016 StuPa election was held on July 4–8, 2016. Of the 23,176 persons eligible to vote,
3671 took part in the election and cast 3648 valid ballots; 23 were deemed invalid. Thus, the
turnout was 15.8%. The results are displayed in Table 1, and the complete official report is
downloadable from [Endgueltige Wahlergebnisse 2016]. For more information about the StuPa
and the 2016 StuPa election see the KIT student journal [Ventil 2016].
The AStA webpage has a link to the StuPa-O-Mat, the KIT adaptation of the Wahl-O-Mat
for the StuPa election. The 2016 StuPa-O-Mat questions are selected and formulated by the
four-person StuPa electoral committee; for the full list of questions see the Appendix.
1All graphics and most of the tables in the paper were computed using MATLAB 2016a with LATEX output.
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Table 1: Results of the 2016 election to the KIT Student Parliament
Party logo Party description Official
votes
Experimental votes
All votes Of the
StuPa-
O-Mat
users
Other (of
non-users
of StuPa-
O-Mat)
Num % Num % Num % Num %
FiPS (Fachschaftserfahrung im Parlament der
Studierenden = Faculty Experience in the Par-
liament of Students); a local student organi-
zation of the KIT, independent of established
political parties; dedicated, close to students
[FiPS 2016].
1014 29.2 360 33.7 93 24.8 267 38.5
Juso (Jung Sozialisten = Young Socialists);
the youth wing of the SPD (Sozialdemokra-
tische Partei Deutschlands = Social Demo-
cratic Party of Germany), internationally af-
filiated with the YES (Young European So-
cialists) and the IUSY (International Union of
Socialist Youth) [Juso-Hochschulgruppen 2016,
Juso 2016, Young Socialists 2016]; promotes
freedom, equality and solidarity, open discus-
sion, democracy in all parts of society, having
an impact on all parts of society; representation
in many forums
637 18.4 176 16.5 70 18.7 106 15.3
LHG (Bundesverband Liberaler Hochschul-
gruppen = Federal Association of Liberal
Students’ Groups); associated with the
FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei = Free
Democratic Party); a full member of the
LYMEC (European Liberal Youth), which
itself is tied to the European Liberal Demo-
crat and Reform Party in the European
Union [Freie Demokratische Partei 2016,
Federal Association of Liberal Students 2016];
liberal, ideology-free
557 16.1 138 12.9 59 15.7 79 11.4
RCDS (Ring christlich-demokratischer Studen-
ten = Association of Christian Democratic
Students); stands politically near the German
conservative union CDU/CSU (Christlich
Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-
Soziale Union in Bayern = Christian
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
in Bavaria); one of five founding mem-
bers of the European Democrat Students
[Association of Christian Democratic Students,
RCDS 2016]; promotes pragmatic and factual
thinking, representing the student body with-
out ideological influence; aiming for an ideal
development for learning and teaching; strives
for greatest possible impact for students
414 11.9 100 9.4 33 8.8 67 9.7
die Linke.SDS (die Linke. Soztialistisch-
Demokratischer Studierendenverband = The
Left. Social Democratic Students’ Alliance);
the student organization of die Linke =
The Left [The Left 2016, Linke.SDS 2016a,
Linke.SDS 2016b]; promotes a more social, eco-
logical, feminist and sustainable university; sep-
aration between economic system and research;
supports students with social projects
354 10.2 124 11.6 52 13.9 72 10.4
Continued next page. . .
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Table 1: Results of the 2016 election to the KIT Student Parliament
Party logo Party description Official
votes
Experimental votes
All votes Of the
StuPa-
O-Mat
users
Other (of
non-users
of StuPa-
O-Mat)
Num % Num % Num % Num %
die LISTE (Liste fu¨r basisdemokratische Ini-
tiative, Studium, Tierzucht und Elitenbefo¨r-
derung = List for Grassroots Democratic Ini-
tiatives, Education, Animal Breeding and Pro-
motion of Elites); the youth organization of die
PARTEI (Partei fu¨r Arbeit, Rechtstaat, Tier-
schutz, Elitenfo¨rderung und basisdemokratis-
che Initiative = Party for Labor, Rule of
Law, Animal Protection, Promotion of Elites
and Grassroots Democratic Initiative), a small
party with parodical character [LISTE 2016,
PARTEI 2016]; promotes humanization of stud-
ies, solidarity and egalitarianism, particularly
among students of different graduation levels
320 9.2 111 10.4 39 10.4 72 10.4
Rosa Liste = Pink List; close to Schwul-
lesbische Wa¨hlerInneninitiative Rosa
Liste Mu¨nchen = Munich Gay and
Lesbian Voters Initiative, Rosa Liste
[Rosa Liste Mu¨nchen 2016, Rosa Liste 2016];
promotes allowing anyone to study regardless
of financial, physical, mental or family obsta-
cles. Stands for a more peaceful and ethical
university, and against discrimination based on
gender or sexual orientation
173 5.0 60 5.6 29 7.7 31 4.5
Total 3469 1069 375 694
3 The experimental election to the KIT Student Parliament
During the 2016 official election to the KIT Student Parliament, a parallel experimental election
was organized. In addition to the official electoral ballot with seven student party names, each
voter was offered an experimental ballot to be filled in on voluntary basis; see Figure 1.
The experimental ballot is entitled ‘The Third Vote’ because it complements the German
two-vote system2 with an additional vote in the form of embedded referenda. The preamble
to the ballot explains the goal of the experiment — and that it does not impact the official
election. For analysis purposes, the voter is asked to indicate the party he/she voted for in the
official ballot and whether the StuPa-O-Mat had influenced the choice. The table at the bottom
contains ten representative questions on university policies. They are heuristically selected from
the 27 StuPa-O-Mat questions to discriminate between the party profiles so that each question
receives Yes-answers from at least two parties, and No-answers from at least two other parties.
From the 3671 registered voters, 1098 experimental ballots were received. The 29 with
incomplete responses were removed as invalid. In the rest of the paper, we focus on three sets of
valid experimental ballots: all ballots, those of the StuPa-O-Mat users, and the rest, i.e. those
of non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat. Correspondingly, we speak of three voter sets. By the second
vote we mean the party indicated in the experimental ballot, and by the third vote we mean
the answers to the ten questions underneath. We consider three hypothetical StuPas, each as if
elected with one of the three sets of experimental ballots (not as in the official election).
2The first vote being for an individual representative of the constituency, the second vote for a party; the
second vote is decisive because it determines the proportion of parliament factions.
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– EXPERIMENT –
“The Third Vote”
In this experiment, we wish to test the idea of Prof. Andranik Tangian aimed at making representative
democracy more representative. With this alternative election method, the electorate’s policy profile
is measured using a third vote. The policy profile of the electorate is compared with that of the
candidate parties, and the degree to which they match determines the election result. In this way,
we endeavor to overcome irrational behavior and voting partiality.
Participation in the survey is completely voluntary, anonymous and hasNO influence on the offi-
cial election. Results of our analysis will be be made available on www.studierendenwahl.econ.kit.edu.
For further questions, please do not hesitate to ask the election coordinators at the ballot boxes.
What party did you vote for on the official ballot?
Liberale Hochschulgruppe (LHG)
RCDS - Ring christlich-demokratischer Studenten
Liste fu¨r basisdemokratische Initiative, Studium, Tierzucht und Elitenbefo¨rderung (LISTE) /
Liste unabha¨ngiger studierender Tierzu¨chter (LUST)
FiPS - Fachschaftserfahrung im Parlament der Studierenden
Die Linke.SDS
Rosa Liste
Juso - studentisch, demokratisch, solidarisch
Did you use the StuPa-O-Mat to help you make your choice?
yes
no
Please answer these selected StuPa-O-Mat questions to help us define your policy
profile:
+ o − #
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg-wide off-peak ticket with the semester fee 1
More video surveillance in insecure areas of campus, e.g. lockers 2
More vegan choices in the cafeteria, even if it limits meat meals 3
Abolish admission restrictions for courses of study 4
Sexism is a current problem at the KIT 5
Abolish the maximum duration of study 6
Promote gender-neutral restroom facilities on campus 7
Heavily restrict commercial advertising on campus 8
Special deals on tickets to cultural events with the semester fee 9
Replace low-attendance lectures with recordings and exercise classes 10
+ agree o neutral − against
Figure 1: English translation of the experimental electoral ballot
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Table 2: Positions of seven student parties on ten StuPa-O-Mat questions (1—Yes, 0—No, ?—
Abstained, neutral position or missing answer) and balances of opinions on these questions in
three sets of voters who participated in the experiment: (a) all voters, (b) the StuPa-O-Mat
users, and (c) others, i.e. StuPa-O-Mat non-users
Questions F
iP
S
J
u
so
L
H
G
R
C
D
S
L
in
k
e
L
IS
T
E
R
o
sa
All voters who par-
ticipated in the ex-
periment
StuPa-O-Mat users
who participated in
the experiment
Others who partici-
pated in the exper-
iment (non-users of
StuPa-O-Mat)
Pros Cons Majority Pros Cons Majority Pros Cons Majority
% % 1/0 % % 1/0 % % 1/0
1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg-
wide off-peak ticket
with the semester fee 0 0 0 ? 1 1 1 46 31 1 39 37 1 50 28 1
2 More video surveil-
lance in insecure areas of
campus, e.g. lockers 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 17 49 0 20 52 0 15 48 0
3 More vegan choices in
the cafeteria, even if it
limits meat meals ? ? 0 0 1 0 1 31 37 0 37 33 1 28 38 0
4 Abolish admission re-
strictions for courses of
study 0 0 0 0 ? 1 1 21 54 0 22 52 0 20 55 0
5 Sexism is a current
problem at the KIT 1 ? 0 ? 1 ? 1 12 44 0 15 43 0 11 45 0
6 Abolish the maximum
duration of study 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 37 39 0 39 38 1 35 39 0
7 Promote gender-
neutral restroom facili-
ties on campus ? 0 0 0 1 0 1 15 48 0 19 45 0 13 49 0
8 Heavily restrict com-
mercial advertising on
campus 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 22 41 0 21 43 0 23 39 0
9 Special deals on tick-
ets to cultural events
with the semester fee 0 ? 0 0 1 0 1 34 32 1 31 39 0 36 28 1
10 Replace low-
attendance lectures
with recordings and
exercise classes 0 0 0 ? 0 ? 1 31 35 0 21 46 0 36 30 1
Table 1 provides the statistics of the second vote (by party name) in the experimental
ballots. Table 2 deals with the third vote, showing both the party positions on the ten selected
StuPa-O-Mat questions and the balance of voters’ opinions on these questions. Additionally to
the percentage of protagonists and antagonists (those who answered Yes or No to the questions,
respectively), Table 2 indicates the majority opinion (1 = Yes; 0 = No).
Figure 2 visualizes Tables 1 and 2. The blue bars depict the balance of opinions in the three
voter groups as given in Table 2. For each question and each set of voters, the blue segment to
the left of the vertical 0-axis shows the percentage of antagonists, and the blue segment on the
right hand shows the percentage of protagonists. To better visualize the majority opinion, the
total length of the blue bar is normalized (proportionally extended to 100%) and shown by a
box. The majority opinion is on the side where the box surpasses the ±50% limit. For instance,
the majority opinion on Question 1 in all three voter sets is ‘Yes’.
The smaller color bars show the StuPa factions (with no adjustment to integer number of
StuPa seats). The lengths of the color segments are proportional to the faction sizes, assuming
6
                Balance of opinions       Rosa       RCDS       LISTE       Linke       LHG       Juso       FiPS
-100% -50% 0 50% 100%   
Percentage of NO/YES votes
(abstensions have been omitted)
10  Replace low-attendance lectures with recordings and exercise classes
9  Special deals on tickets to cultural events with the semester fee
8  Heavily restrict commercial advertising on campus
7  Promote gender-neutral restroom facilities on campus
6  Abolish the maximum duration of study
5  Sexism is a current problem at the KIT
4  Abolish admission restrictions for courses of study
3  More vegan choices in the cafeteria, even if it limits meat meals
2  More video surveillance in insecure areas of campus, e.g. lockers
1  Baden-Württemberg-wide off-peak ticket with the semester fee
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
Others
SPoM users
All voters
NO YES
Figure 2: Balance of opinions on ten questions (blue—factual, box—normalized) in three sets of
voters who participated in the experiment and representation thereof by the 2016 KIT Student
parliament as if elected within the corresponding set of voters with the second votes (by party
name). The sets of voters are: (a) all voters, (b) the StuPa-O-Mat users, and (c) other voters
(non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat). The size of a party’s bar is proportional to the second votes
received in the corresponding group. A party color segment is missing if the party’s position on
the question is indefinite.
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that elections are made in each voter set with the second votes (by party name) whose statistics
are displayed in Table 1. (Therefore, their length depends on the given voter set.) If a party
has no position on a question, its color bar is not shown. The bar’s position to the left or to
the right of the vertical 0-axis corresponds to the party’s position on the question as given in
Table 2. The bias of the segmented color bars from the vertical 0-axis visualizes the Yes/No
majority opinion of the StuPa. For instance, the StuPa’s position on Question 1 is opposite to
that of a majority of voters in all three voter sets.
4 Policy representation by the student parties and the Student
Parliament
To measure policy representation, we use two indices, popularity and universality. Let us illus-
trate their construction, referring to the data from Table 2 as depicted in Figure 2.
For purposes of illustration, we restrict our attention to the set of all voters and the FiPS
party. For Question 1, ‘Baden-Wu¨rttemberg-wide off-peak ticket with the semester fee’, the
balance of public opinion, with 46% protagonists and 31% antagonists, is shown by the upper
blue bar. The balance of opinions is normalized, that is, extended proportionally to 100%, as
shown by the box. Thereby, we assume that abstaining voters’ passive preferences for ‘Yes’ and
‘No’ are distributed in the proportion of the protagonist-to-antagonist ratio. For Question 1,
the FiPS represents the actual and ‘passive’ antagonists, having the representativeness
r
FiPS,1
=
0.31
0.31 + 0.46
≈ 0.40 .
With the ‘No’ answer to Question 2, ‘More video surveillance in insecure areas of campus, e.g.
lockers’, the FiPS expresses the opinion of 49% of antagonists versus 17% of protagonists. Taking
into account the ‘passive’ antagonists, we obtain the FiPS’ representativeness for Question 2:
r
FiPS,2
=
0.49
0.49 + 0.17
≈ 0.74 ,
and so on. Taking the average representativeness of the FiPS over the questions with the FiPS’
positions (there are eight such questions, and two answers are missing), we obtain the party’s
popularity index:
PFiPS =
8∑
q=1
r
FiPS, q
8
=
0.403 + 0.74 + · · ·
8
≈ 0.53 .
The FiPS universality index is the fraction of the questions on which the FiPS represents
a majority of voters. Again, we consider only the eight questions with known FiPS positions.
Since the FiPS represents a majority on six out of eight questions,
UFiPS =
∑
q:r
FiPS, q
≥0.5
1
8
=
8∑
q=1
round
[
r
FiPS, q
]
8
=
5
8
≈ 0.63 .
The indices of popularity and universality for the other sets of voters and other parties are
computed in the same way. Since for each party we consider only the questions on which the
party gave definitive answers, question weights vary from one party to another (1/8 for FiPS,
1/7 for Juso, 1/10 for LHG, etc.). Assuming that the StuPa’s decision on every question is made
by a majority vote, we can define the StuPa’s policy profile using the Yes/No answers to all the
questions and compute its indices of popularity and universality in the same way as for a party;
for the indices of the student parties and the StuPa see Figure 3.
In Figure 3, the parties are sorted in decreasing order of the mean of their six indices. We
use the mean index because the popularity and universality indices are highly correlated, as
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Figure 3: Indices of popularity (P) and universality (U) of the KIT student parties and that
of the KIT Student Parliament, as if elected by second votes within the following voter sets:
(a) all voters; (s) the StuPa-O-Mat users; and (o) others (non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat). The
percentages of party second votes are indicated for the set of all voters.
Table 3: Pearson correlation between eleven (7× 1)-vectors with: (1) official party votes (in the
official election), (2) all experimental second votes, (3) those of the StuPa-O-Mat users, (4) other
experimental votes (i.e. those of non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat), (5–13) party popularity (P)
and universality (U) indices and their means based on answers to ten questions in experimental
ballots by voter set
Second votes Indices
All experim. ballots SPoM user ballots Other exper. ballots
Official
votes
Exp.
votes
Exp.
SPoM
Exp.
others
P U Mean P U Mean P U Mean
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Official votes 1.00 0.96∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.44 0.53 0.51 0.62 0.39 0.49 0.31 0.21 0.25
Exp. votes 0.96∗∗∗ 1.00 0.93∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.22 0.32 0.30 0.43 0.25 0.32 0.09 0.01 0.04
Exp. SPoM 0.95∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.00 0.89∗∗∗ 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.56 0.39 0.47 0.20 0.03 0.08
Exp. others 0.94∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 1.00 0.18 0.28 0.26 0.38 0.20 0.27 0.05 0.01 0.02
P exp. all 0.44 0.22 0.35 0.18 1.00 0.95∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
U exp. all 0.53 0.32 0.42 0.28 0.95∗∗∗ 1.00 1.00∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
Mean all 0.51 0.30 0.41 0.26 0.97∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00 0.97∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
P exp. SPoM 0.62 0.43 0.56 0.38 0.97∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.00 0.88∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.83∗∗
U exp. SPoM 0.39 0.25 0.39 0.20 0.88∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 1.00 0.98∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.59 0.69∗
Mean SPoM 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.94∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.00 0.91∗∗∗ 0.68∗ 0.76∗∗
P exp. others 0.31 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.99∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.00 0.91∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
U exp. others 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.87∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.59 0.68∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.00 0.99∗∗∗
Mean others 0.25 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.93∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.69∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.00
∗∗∗ PVAL ≤ 0.01
∗∗ 0.01 < PVAL ≤ 0.05
∗ 0.05 < PVAL ≤ 0.10
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shown in Table 3. The same is observed for the second votes (by party name) both in the official
election and in all three sets of voters in the experimental election. The high correlation between
the second votes across our voter sets means that a voter’s party self-identification exerts little
influence on his/her use (or not) of the StuPa-O-Mat.
The correlation between the parties’ second votes and their representativeness indices is
much lower, meaning that the second vote fails to produce high-quality policy representation.
The lowest correlation between second votes and indices of representativeness is inherent in the
set of non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat, which is not surprising given that these voters did not test
the parties with respect to their policy preferences. The low consistency between second votes
and expressed policy preferences is particularly evident when comparing the FiPS’ position in
Table 1 and Figure 3. In the experiment, the FiPS is the absolute winner, garnering 33.7% of
all second votes, twice more than its next competitor. However, it is ranked only fourth with
respect to policy representation in Figure 3.
5 Evaluation of coalitions
In real politics, parliament factions unite in coalitions, and only those with >50% of the parlia-
ment seats are eligible to govern. The eligible coalitions are usually minimal, i.e. they contain
no more parties than necessary, because the more parties, the more complex the negotiations
and the less power enjoyed by each faction; cf. Riker’s minimum winning coalitions [Riker 1962].
For instance, the coalition FiPS–Juso–LHG is eligible but not minimal; that is, the coalition
FiPS–Juso, being itself eligible, does not need LHG.
Another important condition is the parties’ political compatibility, which we measure with
the index of unanimity— the percentage of the questions on which all the coalition factions agree.
A high degree of unanimity facilitates coalition formation, because parties with close positions
cooperate more easily. If the unanimity is below 50% the coalition is more incompatible than
compatible. Therefore, we consider only minimal eligible coalitions with the unanimity >50%.
Such coalitions we call probable governing coalitions.
If a coalition is unanimous on a certain question, then its position on it is the same as of
every member. If coalition members disagree on an issue, then the probabilities of the coalition’s
Yes/No answer to this question could be assumed proportional to the protagonist-to-antagonist
ratio within the coalition. As expressed in a personal conversation by Tobias Lindner, Bundestag
member (GRU¨NE), the reality is even more uncertain.
To deal with the uncertainty in coalition decision making, we introduce the parameter p —
proportionality of influence to size of the faction — 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, which we explain here with
an example. Suppose that, for a certain question, the protagonist-to-antagonist ratio within a
coalition is 3:1, that is, the Yes-faction is three times larger than the No-faction. The p = 1
denotes the exact proportionality of influence to size, when the coalition answers ‘Yes’ with the
probability equal to the weight of the Yes-faction 3/(3+1) = 3/4, and ‘No’ with the probability
equal to the weight of the No-faction 1/4. The p = 0 denotes no proportionality of influence to
size, that is, the coalition adopts each alternative opinion with equal chances 1/2. The medium
uncertainty p = 1/2 means that the influence of faction sizes on the coalition answer is a mix of
the two extreme cases in proportion p = 1/2 and 1− p = 1/2:
Prob (Yes) = p︸︷︷︸
1/2
× 3/4︸︷︷︸
Size influence
of Yes-faction
+(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/2
× 1/2︸︷︷︸
No influence
of size
= 5/8
Prob (No) = p︸︷︷︸
1/2
× 1/4︸︷︷︸
Size influence
of No-faction
+(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/2
× 1/2︸︷︷︸
No influence
of size
= 3/8 .
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In the rest of the paper, all computations are made for the medium uncertainty p = 1/2.
Since coalitions have positions on policy issues, they can be characterized with the indices
of popularity and universality which, under uncertainty, turn into random variables. Then
the coalition’s popularity and universality are understood as the expected size of the group
represented and the expected frequency in representing a majority, respectively. These indices
are no longer exact magnitudes but estimates, with their standard deviation regarded as the
estimation accuracy. Below, the coalition indices and their standard deviations are computed
with formulas from [Tangian 2014, p. 338].
The goal of our experiment is to compare the policy representation capacity of the StuPa
elected solely with the second votes and the StuPa elected using the third votes (the StuPa
redistributed). In the latter case the party faction sizes are made proportional to the party mean
indices of popularity and universality (without adjustments of percentages to integer numbers of
seats). Taking a page from real politics, we consider the StuPa dominated by the most probable
governing coalition, that is, by the minimal eligible coalition with the highest unanimity, which
is most important for coalition formation.
The upper sections of Tables 4–6 characterize probable governing coalitions in the 2016
StuPa elected within the three voter sets by just their second votes (by party name); the lower
sections characterize the same thing but with StuPa seats redistributed according to the third
vote. The coalitions are numbered by decreasing unanimity, and the numbers of the coalitions in
the redistributed StuPa are marked with an ‘R’. Note that, for all the indices, larger values mean
‘better’ and are ranked higher, whereas greater standard deviations are ranked lower, because
they mean a lower index accuracy. The most probable governing coalitions, that is, those with
the highest degree of unanimity, have the numbers 1 and R1 in Tables 4–6 and are located at
the tops of the table sections.
Tables 4–6 are illustrated with 3D Figures 4–6, where coalitions are depicted by concatenated
color bars whose lengths are proportional to the faction sizes. The coalition’s unanimity is shown
by the height of the flagstaff, and its X–Y coordinates are the coalition indices of popularity
and universality. The blue flagstaffs distinguish the coalitions of the StuPa elected with the
second vote, and the red flagstaffs those of the StuPa elected with the third vote. The coalition
numbers in these figures are the same as in the associated table.
For the set of all voters, the top coalition in the StuPa elected by the second vote, FiPS–Juso,
has the popularity and universality indices of 41.9 and 61.8, respectively. These indices for the
top coalition in the StuPa elected by the third vote, Juso–LHG–RCDS, are superior: 44.1 and
66.2; see Table 4.
For the set of StuPa-O-Mat users, no increase in policy representation due to election by
the third vote is observed; see Table 5. The representativeness indices of the top coalition in
the StuPa elected by the second vote are 45.0 and 62.3, whereas that of the StuPa elected by
the third vote are 43.8 and 63.1 — one index is little lower, the other is little higher. It seems
that those who test the parties’ policy profiles with the StuPa-O-Mat vote quite consistently
with their policy preferences, leaving little room for the third vote to improve the StuPa policy
representation.
The most significant improvement in the StuPa policy representation is inherent in the set of
non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat: the representativeness indices of the top coalition in the StuPa
elected by the second vote, FiPS–Juso, are 40.6 and 53.3, and in the StuPa elected by the third
vote, the indices of the top coalition Juso–LHG–RCDS are significantly higher — 44.0 and 62.8;
see Table 6. This means that non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat vote least consistently with their
policy preferences.
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Table 4: Indices of probable governing coalitions in the StuPa elected by the second vote within
the set of all voters and of that elected by the third vote (redistributed), as computed for the
impact of faction weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
Coalitions StuPa seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Expectation Standard
deviation
Expectation Standard
deviation
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
1 FiPS–Juso 50.1 / 4 100.0 / 1 41.9 / 2 ±5.1 / 4 61.8 / 1 ±14.4 / 3
2 FiPS–LHG–RCDS 55.9 / 2 70.0 / 2 41.3 / 3 ±3.3 / 1 58.2 / 3 ±11.5 / 2
3 FiPS–LHG–LISTE 57.0 / 1 60.0 / 3 40.9 / 4 ±3.4 / 2 54.2 / 4 ±10.6 / 1
4 FiPS–RCDS–LISTE 53.4 / 3 60.0 / 3 42.3 / 1 ±3.6 / 3 59.1 / 2 ±10.6 / 1
Coalitions for redistributed seats
1R Juso–LHG–RCDS 51.2 / 2 80.0 / 1 44.1 / 2 ±4.1 / 2 66.2 / 2 ±12.2 / 3
2R Juso–LHG–LISTE 50.1 / 3 70.0 / 2 43.8 / 3 ±4.1 / 3 61.2 / 3 ±11.5 / 2
3R FiPS–Juso–RCDS–LISTE 64.0 / 1 60.0 / 3 45.0 / 1 ±3.6 / 1 66.5 / 1 ±10.6 / 1
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Figure 4: Indices of probable governing coalitions in the StuPa elected by the second vote within
the set of all voters and of that elected by the third vote (redistributed), as computed for the
impact of faction weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50. The blue flagstaffs show the
coalitions of the StuPa elected with the second vote, and the red flagstaffs those of the StuPa
elected with the third vote.
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Table 5: Indices of probable governing coalitions in the StuPa elected by the second vote within
the set of the StuPa-O-Mat users and of that elected by the third vote (redistributed), as
computed for the impact of faction weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
Coalitions StuPa seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Expectation Standard
deviation
Expectation Standard
deviation
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
1 FiPS–Juso–RCDS 52.3 / 4 90.0 / 1 45.0 / 1 ±3.9 / 4 62.3 / 2 ±13.0 / 4
2 FiPS–Juso–LHG 59.2 / 1 80.0 / 2 44.1 / 4 ±3.8 / 3 60.0 / 5 ±12.2 / 3
3 FiPS–Juso–LISTE 53.9 / 2 70.0 / 3 44.7 / 2 ±4.0 / 5 60.5 / 3 ±11.5 / 2
4 FiPS–LHG–LISTE 50.9 / 5 60.0 / 4 42.9 / 5 ±3.4 / 1 60.5 / 4 ±10.6 / 1
5 Juso–LHG–RCDS–LISTE 53.6 / 3 60.0 / 4 44.7 / 3 ±3.5 / 2 62.3 / 1 ±10.6 / 1
Coalitions for redistributed seats
1R Juso–LHG–LISTE 50.1 / 3 70.0 / 1 43.8 / 3 ±4.0 / 3 63.1 / 1 ±11.5 / 3
2R FiPS–Juso–LHG–RCDS 62.2 / 1 70.0 / 1 44.6 / 2 ±3.3 / 1 61.2 / 3 ±11.5 / 2
3R FiPS–Juso–RCDS–LISTE 60.7 / 2 60.0 / 2 44.8 / 1 ±3.5 / 2 62.0 / 2 ±10.6 / 1
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Figure 5: Indices of probable governing coalitions in the StuPa elected by the second vote
within the set of the StuPa-O-Mat users and of that elected by the third vote (redistributed),
as computed for the impact of faction weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50. The blue
flagstaffs show the coalitions of the StuPa elected with the second vote, and the red flagstaffs
those of the StuPa elected with the third vote.
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Table 6: Indices of probable governing coalitions in the StuPa elected by the second vote within
the set of non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat and of that elected by the third vote (redistributed),
as computed for the impact of faction weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
Coalitions StuPa seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Expectation Standard
deviation
Expectation Standard
deviation
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
1 FiPS–Juso 53.7 / 4 100.0 / 1 40.6 / 2 ±5.6 / 4 53.3 / 2 ±14.4 / 3
2 FiPS–LHG–RCDS 59.5 / 2 70.0 / 2 40.2 / 3 ±3.7 / 2 52.9 / 3 ±11.5 / 2
3 FiPS–LHG–LISTE 60.2 / 1 60.0 / 3 39.6 / 4 ±3.7 / 1 49.0 / 4 ±10.6 / 1
4 FiPS–RCDS–LISTE 58.5 / 3 6 0.0 / 3 41.5 / 1 ±3.9 / 3 55.8 / 1 ±10.6 / 1
Coalitions for redistributed seats
1R Juso–LHG–RCDS 50.5 / 2 80.0 / 1 44.0 / 1 ±4.6 / 2 62.8 / 1 ±12.2 / 2
2R FiPS–Juso–LHG–LISTE 62.5 / 1 60.0 / 2 43.3 / 2 ±3.7 / 1 56.8 / 2 ±10.6 / 1
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Figure 6: Indices of probable governing coalitions in the StuPa elected by the second vote within
the set of non-users of the StuPa-O-Mat and of that elected by the third vote (redistributed),
as computed for the impact of faction weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50. The blue
flagstaffs show the coalitions of the StuPa elected with the second vote, and the red flagstaffs
those of the StuPa elected with the third vote.
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6 Discussion
The third-vote alternative election method tested differs from voting by name both in its election
architecture (cf. ‘software architecture’ in computer science, which characterizes the order of
operations) and in its political philosophy. We explain this with an example that goes back to
Ostrogorski’s paradox [Nurmi 1999, pp. 70–73] and [Gehrlein and Lepelley 2011, pp. 123–124].
Suppose that a scientific journal editor must accept or reject a paper evaluated by three
reviewers with regard to three equally important criteria: (1) new findings, (2) awareness of
literature, and (3) presentation and style. The positive and negative opinions of the reviewers
are shown in Table 7. The table displays two architectures for the evaluation procedure. The
first architecture has the order of operations ↓↓ → . It assumes that opinions are first aggregated
individually by each reviewer, resulting in votes either for (+) or against (−) acceptance of the
article. Then these votes are accounted to make the final decision. Under this architecture, the
paper is rejected by two out of three votes. The second architecture has the order of operations
−→
→ ↓. It assumes that a collective opinion is made for each criterion, and then these partial
opinions are aggregated to make the final decision. Under this architecture, however, the paper
is accepted.
Table 7: Two architectures of editorial decisions based on three reviews
Criterion Reviewers Majority Collective
1 2 3 vote opinion
New findings + + − → +
Awareness of literature + − + → +
Presentation and style + − − → −
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Reviewer’s vote + − − → − +
In fact, the same approach is equally applicable to appointing a candidate to an office (accept
or reject), or choosing between two candidates labeled ‘+’ and ‘−’. The two architectures have
very different background philosophies. The first architecture (with the order of operations
↓↓ →) reflects the liberal philosophy of individual determination based on individualism in
opinions and on understanding the public good as the sum of the good of every individual, in
the spirit of John Locke (1632–1704):
Every man has a “property” in his own “person.” This nobody has any right to but
himself. . .
The public good, i.e. the good of every particular member of that society.
[Locke 1689, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 5, 26, and First Treatise of
Government, Chapter 9, 92]
This philosophy deals with the aggregation of what Rousseau (1712–1778) and Condorcet (1743–
1794) called individual wills. Electors choose their favorite candidates themselves, according to
their own criteria and without being asked why they cast votes for this or that candidate.
The second architecture (with the order of operations −→→ ↓) reflects the philosophy of
public determination. It explicitly articulates the public interest, formulating socially important
questions and asking for the electors’ opinions on them. The society is considered a single body
that has a political profile regarding these issues, resembling the Rousseauvian general will:
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction
of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole. At once, in place of the individual personality of
each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body,
composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from
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this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so
formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of city, and now
takes that of Republic or body politic. . .
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will;
the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest
into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills. . .
[Rousseau 1762, Of Social Contract, Book I, 6 and Book II, 3]
The public profile is used to find the most socially adequate candidate by matching his/her
profile to that of the electorate. This architecture enhances the civic aspect of election and
reduces the partiality of electors’ opinions. It is often used for evaluating new products, project
proposals, scientific contributions, etc., when each referee estimates every quality separately.
This approach is in line with recent business practices. Trying to enhance objectivity in
recruitment procedures, some corporations, e.g. l’Ore´al, Accor and AXA, evaluate job candidates
considering exclusively job-related matters and using anonymous questionnaires without names,
photos or any personal information; for an international survey see [Krause et al. 2010, pp. 8–
21]. This practice is becoming more widespread, and Germany is even shaping it into legal
guidelines [Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes 2010].
7 Conclusions
1. Potential of the third vote. The experiment performed shows that the third vote
can improve policy representation of political bodies elected, especially when voters do
not consult dedicated tools like VAAs. The voters who follow the VAA recommendations
vote much more consistently with their policy preferences, and the third vote only barely
improves election outcomes with regard to policy representation.
2. Statistical justification for dividing experimental votes into sets. It would be use-
ful to determine how statistically significant the differences are between the distributions
of votes in the three voter sets considered in the experiment.
3. Suggestions regarding the experimental ballots. To better study the third vote and
the StuPa-O-Mat effect on the election outcomes, the experimental ballots should include
a ‘clone’ of the full StuPa-O-Mat questionnaire with the option of assigning double weights
to important questions. The selection of ten out of 27 StuPa-O-Mat questions with no
weighting option could be insufficient for accurate analysis. Furthermore, the questions
for the experiment were selected heuristically, including only those with at least two pros
and two cons in the party answers, instead of applying a mathematical model to maximize
the discrimination between the party policy profiles.
4. Suggestions regarding the StuPa-O-Mat. The remark about maximizing the discrim-
ination between party profiles also relates to the StuPa-O-Mat itself. For example, all the
parties provide the same answer to Questions 2, 5, 16, 17 and 25 (see Appendix), making
them redundant. If such redundant questions are numerous, and the parties answers to
them reflect the public opinion, the indices of all the parties increase simultaneously. As
the relative difference between the party indices decreases, the sizes of the party parliament
factions are equalized, leading to a malfunction of the third vote.
The StuPa-O-Mat allows the user to be neutral on an issue, to agree or disagree with it,
and to double its weight to emphasize its importance. In other words, the evaluation scale
is −2,−1, 0,+1,+2. A scale with −5 . . . + 5 points would be even better. However, the
importance of an issue to a voter should be distinguished from his/her degree of preference.
Otherwise, for instance, a weak preference for an important issue can be erroneously coded
with +1 instead of 1× 2 = +2.
16
8 Appendix: StuPa-O-Mat questions and student party posi-
tions
The following table contains all the KIT 2016 StuPa-O-Mat questions in full, in German and
translated into English, together with the student party positions on them (1—Yes, 0—No,
?—Abstained, neutral position or missing answer). The questions included in the experimental
ballot are denoted by boxes around their numbers.
German question with short title English translation L
H
G
R
C
D
S
L
IS
T
E
F
iP
S
L
in
k
e.
S
D
S
R
o
sa
J
u
so
1 Finanzierung der Studierendenschaft. Die
Studierendenschaft soll sich ausschließlich aus
freiwilligen Beitra¨gen finanzieren
Financing the student body. The student
body should be financed exclusively by
voluntary contributions
1 ? 0 0 0 0 0
2 Sa¨uglings- und Kleinkindraum. Am KIT soll
es ein fu¨r Studierende zuga¨nglicher Raum
fu¨r die Verpflegung von Sa¨uglingen und
Kleinkindern geben
Room for children and infants. There
should be a room at the KIT for child
and infant care that students can use
? 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 BaWu¨-weites O¨PNV-Ticket. Ein durch den
verpflichtenden Semesterbeitrag finanziertes
baden-wu¨rttembergweites Feierabend- und
Wochenendticket soll eingefu¨hrt werden
BaWu¨-wide off-peak ticket. A Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg-wide transport ticket for
evenings and weekends, funded through
the mandatory semester fee, should be in-
troduced
0 ? 1 0 1 1 0
4 Mililita¨rische Forschung. Milita¨rische
Forschung soll am KIT eingeschra¨nkt
werden. Antwortmo¨glichkeiten: ‘Milita¨rische
Forschung soll ga¨nzlich verboten sein’;
‘Forschung zu rein milita¨rischen Zwecken soll
verboten sein’; ‘Milita¨rische Forschung soll
ohne Einschra¨nkungen erlaubt sein’
Military research. Military research
should be heavily restricted at the
KIT. Possible answers: ‘Military re-
search should be completely prohibited’;
‘Research for purely military objectives
should be prohibited’; ‘Military research
should be allowed with no restrictions’
0 0 ? ? 1 1 ?
5 Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung am KIT. Die
Studierendenschaft soll sich mit der Aufar-
beitung der Vergangenheit des KIT und der
Vorga¨ngerinstitutionen auseinandersetzen
Dealing with the KIT past. The student
body should take up a debate accounting
for the past of the KIT and its predeces-
sors
? 1 ? 1 1 1 ?
6 Videou¨berwachung. Der Campus soll in
sicherheitsrelevanten Bereichen (z.B. Spinde)
versta¨rkt videou¨berwacht werden
Video surveillance. There should be more
video surveillance in security-sensitive ar-
eas (e.g., lockers) on campus
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
7 Mensa-Gerichte. In der Mensa sollte es mehr
vegane und nachhaltige Wahlmo¨glichkeiten
geben, auch unter Einschra¨nkung des Ange-
bots fleischhaltiger Gerichte
Canteen meals. The canteen should offer
more vegan and sustainable options, even
if this limits the offer of meals containing
meat
0 0 0 ? 1 1 ?
8 Berufseinstieg. Die Studienga¨nge am KIT
sollen auf einen schnellen Berufseinstieg aus-
gelegt sein
Career launch. Courses of study at KIT
should be designed to promote quick en-
try into a career
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
9 Hochschulwettbewerb. Der Wettbewerb zwis-
chen den Hochschulen soll reduziert werden
University competition. Competition be-
tween universities should be reduced
0 0 0 ? 1 1 ?
10 KiTa-Pla¨tze fu¨r Studis. Es soll mehr KiTa
Pla¨tze in Campusna¨he fu¨r Studierende geben
Child care places for students. There
should be more places in daycare facilities
near the KIT for the children of students
? ? ? 1 1 1 ?
11 Raum der Religionen. Es soll ein immer
zuga¨nglicher Raum zur Religionsausu¨bung
durch das KIT bereitgestellt werden
Religion room. The KIT should provide a
room that is always open for the exercise
of religion
0 ? 1 0 ? 1 0
12 Bafo¨G. Das BAfo¨G soll elternunabha¨ngig aus-
gezahlt werden.
BAFo¨G. The BAFo¨G (student financial
aid in Germany) should be independent
of parental income
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
13 Zulassungsbeschra¨nkungen. Zulassungs-
beschra¨nkungen zu Studienga¨ngen sollen
abgeschafft werden
Admission restrictions. Admission re-
strictions for courses of study should be
abolished
0 0 1 0 ? 1 0
Continued next page. . .
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German question with short title English translation L
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14 Sexismus. Sexismus ist aktuell ein Problem
am KIT
Sexism. Sexism is a current problem at
the KIT
0 ? ? 1 1 1 ?
15 Maximalstudienzeit. Die Maximalstudienzeit
in den Studienga¨ngen soll abgeschafft werden
Maximum study duration. The upper
limit on duration of study should be abol-
ished
1 0 1 0 1 1 0
16 Gremien der Studierendenschaft. Das
Studierendenparlament und die Fach-
schaftenkonferenz sollen zu einem Gremium
verschmolzen werden
Committees of the student body. The
Student Parliament and the Conference
of Faculties should be merged together
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 Sponsoring. Auf dem Unifest und bei an-
deren Kulturveranstaltungen der Studieren-
denschaft sollen Sponsoren eingesetzt werden
ko¨nnen
Sponsoring. The student body should
make use of sponsors at events like
the University festival and other cultural
events
1 1 1 1 ? 1 1
18 Geschlechtsneutrale Toiletten. Die Studieren-
denschaft soll sich fu¨r geschlechtsneutrale Toi-
letten auf dem Campus einsetzen
Gender-neutral restrooms. The student
body should campaign for gender-neutral
restroom facilities on campus
0 0 0 ? 1 1 0
19 Bezahlung AStA-Referenten. Studierende,
die ein AStA-Referat besetzen, sollen auss-
chließlich unentgeltlich arbeiten
Payments for AStA speakers. Students
who get involved at AStA should do so
on a strictly unpaid basis
1 0 ? 0 0 0 0
20 Wohnheimsausbau. Der Wohnheimsausbau
soll durch Studierendengelder finanziert wer-
den
Dormitory construction. The expansion
of dormitory facilities should be paid for
by student grants
0 ? 0 0 1 0 0
21 Untertitel Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen. Alle
aufgezeichneten Vorlesungen sollen mit Unter-
titeln hochgeladen werden. Erkla¨rung: Dies
dient der Barrierefreiheit fu¨r Ho¨rgescha¨digte
Subtitles in lecture videos. All recorded
courses should be uploaded with subti-
tles (for inclusion of hearing-impaired stu-
dents)
1 ? ? 1 1 1 0
22 fzs. Die Studierendenschaft soll Mitglied
im fzs (Freier Zusammenschluss von Stu-
dentInnenschaften) werden. Erkla¨rung: Der
fzs ist ein bundesweiter und u¨berparteilicher
Dachverband der Studierendenschaften. Er
vertritt Studierende auf Bundesebene und ist
Mitglied in der europa¨ischen Studierenden-
vertretung (ESU). Die Mitgliedschaft kostet
aktuell 40ct pro Studierendem pro Semester
fzs. The student body should become
a member of the fzs (Freier Zusammen-
schluss von Studenten). Explanation: the
fzs is a nationwide and politically neutral
alliance of student bodies. It represents
students at the federal level and is a mem-
ber of European Student Union (ESU).
Currently the member fee is 40 ct. per
student per semester
0 0 0 0 1 1 ?
23 Werbung auf dem Campus. Werbung von
Unternehmen auf dem Campus soll stark
eingeschra¨nkt werden
Advertisements on campus. Promo-
tion and advertisements from companies
should be heavily restricted on campus
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
24 Kulturveranstaltungen. Die Studierenden-
schaft soll sich fu¨r vergu¨nstigte Eintritte
zu Kulturveranstaltungen mithilfe eines
verpflichtenden Semesterbeitrags einsetzen
Cultural events. The student body should
advocate special deals on entrance fees
and cultural events by introducing a
mandatory semester fee
0 0 0 0 1 1 ?
25 Barrierefreiheit. Alle Ra¨ume des KIT sollen
barrierefrei zuga¨nglich sein
Accessibility. All areas of the KIT should
be accessible without restrictions
1 1 1 ? 1 1 1
26 Schlecht besuchte Vorlesungen. Schlecht be-
suchte Vorlesungen sollen durch Aufzeichnun-
gen und u¨bungen ersetzt werden
Poorly attended lectures. Lectures with
low attendance rates should be replaced
by recordings and exercise classes
0 ? ? 0 0 1 0
27 Politisches Mandat. Die Studierendenschaft
soll sich weiterhin allgemeinpolitisch a¨ußern
du¨rfen. Erkla¨rung: Der Koalitionsvertrag der
neuen gru¨n-schwarzen Landesregierung sieht
Einschra¨nkungen im politischen Mandat der
Studierendenschaft vor. Sie soll sich nur noch
hochschulpolitisch a¨ußern du¨rfen
Political mandate. The student body
should participate in the general political
debate. Explanation: the coalition agree-
ment of the latest green-black (Green-
CDU/CSU) state government intends to
limit the political mandate of student
bodies, restricting them to issues of uni-
versity policy only
1 0 1 1 1 1 1
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